by Francesca Giannoni-Crystal
Introduction While space resource utilization (SRU)—which is the technical term for space mining—is still prospective, technological advances and private-sector ambitions are rapidly turning it into a near-future reality, especially on the Moon.
The Moon contains abundant and diverse natural resources of potential scientific, industrial, and commercial value; lunar regolith holds oxygen, silicon, iron, aluminum, magnesium, and titanium, while permanently shadowed craters near the poles preserve significant deposits of water ice, which may be dissociated into hydrogen and oxygen for life support or rocket propellant.1 Particularly noteworthy on the Moon is helium-3, identified as a promising fuel for nuclear fusion and an essential element for quantum computing, making it a potential export commodity to Earth.2 Early lunar mining will likely focus on extracting ice and helium-3, with in-situ utilization of regolith for additive manufacturing of habitats and vehicles.3
Beyond the Moon, other celestial bodies offer compelling mining prospects: Mars harbors surface and subsurface ice and minerals essential to long-term habitation and industrial activity,4 while near-Earth asteroids contain high concentrations of nickel, cobalt, and platinum-group metals, as well as volatile compounds such as water ice.5 Depending on economic feasibility, two major operational paradigms are likely to emerge—the in-situ resource utilization model and the return-to-Earth model—both pivotal to establishing a self-sustaining space economy.6
Several commercial companies are preparing to initiate space-mining projects, adopting either an in-situ resource-utilization model or a return-to-Earth model. A few examples illustrate these emerging approaches. Interlune—founded by former Blue Origin executives—leads current efforts to extract lunar helium-3 (a pursuit still technically challenging but bolstered by strong industrial partnerships and offtake agreements) and plans to launch a demonstration mission by 2027, and together with Vermeer, has developed a prototype excavator capable of processing about 100 metric tons of lunar regolith per hour.7 TransAstra—a U.S. company combining orbital services with long-term mining goals—has outlined plans to extract volatiles at the lunar poles (currently in early R&D), supported by NASA’s Innovative Advanced Concepts Program and centered on its “Optical Mining®” method, which uses concentrated sunlight to release volatiles without drilling from the Moon or asteroids.8 Beyond lunar initiatives, AstroForge—backed by over $50 million in venture funding—has pursued asteroid-mining missions, including the 2025 Odin probe (which lost contact after launch)9 and a planned follow-up, Vestri, aimed at testing resource identification and in-space refining.10 These initiatives, while significant, only scratch the surface of the extensive planning, research, and development efforts now defining the emerging field of SRU.
The Interplay Between International and National Approaches Some academic debate continues over the permissibility of resource extraction under international law11 and especially under the Outer Space Treaty (OST)12 The OST, signed in 1967 and now ratified by more than 110 countries, is widely regarded as the cornerstone of international space law. The OST, however, does not explicitly address SRU: the OST was adopted in an era dominated by State actors, when space resource utilization was not yet on the horizon, except in the limited form of sample collection by State-led missions for scientific purposes.
At the international level, there has been movement toward developing guidance on this issue. Under the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)—the principal UN body responsible for developing international space law—a Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities has been established to examine the legal framework governing such activities.13 In 2025, the group circulated an Updated Initial Draft Set of Recommended Principles for Space Resource Activities (COPUOS Draft) which is at this time an unofficial working draft, proposing non-binding norms on authorization, transparency, due regard, and “equitable access” to space resources.14 This latter language—but also the general undertone to the document—is reminiscent of the equitable-sharing provisions and other collaborative provisions of the 1979 Moon Agreement,15 declined by the major spacefaring nations. The Moon Agreement, in fact, introduced the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” and a system of equitable sharing. However, as mentioned, the majority of spacefaring nations—including the United States, Russia, and China—have not ratified it, leaving it with little relevance to current practice. Moreover, the few States that are parties have not developed implementing mechanisms for its provisions, rendering it largely aspirational.
Because of its resemblance to the Moon Agreement, it remains uncertain whether the COPUOS Draft could ever achieve consensus within COPUOS, particularly among the major spacefaring States. China, in a formal submission, supported continued dialogue but emphasized that any framework must remain within the bounds of existing space law and especially the OST.16 The United States has not formally expressed a position on the draft. However, the draft’s reference to “equitable access”—which recalls the redistributive language of the Moon Agreement—and its other restraint-oriented provisions contrast with the U.S. emphasis on freedom of commercial use and its rejection of outer space as a “global commons,” making ratification by the United States unlikely.17
While the international community’s progress on SRU is slow, national initiatives have advanced more rapidly, with several States already asserting jurisdictional control—within the limits of the OST—over SRU activities by enacting space resource utilization (SRU Laws). These laws are, on one side, the principal means by which States define and legitimize the extraction of resources from outer space, but on the other side are also national implementation of the duty of authorization and supervision of national activities imposed by Article VI of the OST, which obliges States to authorize and continuously supervise the activities of non-governmental entities. Absent specific guidance at the international level, domestic authorization and oversight serve as the primary jurisdictional hooks for SRU projects.
Some criticize these laws on the ground that they would conflict with the non-appropriation principle set forth in Article II of the OST (“[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”), which SRU critics interpret as barring private property rights in extracted resources, as such private claims could, in their view, amount to indirect national appropriation. This is not the majority view and certainly not the position of the main spacefaring nations, as reflected in their enactment of SRU laws and the substantial silence—or lack of formal protest—by other States. The majority view is that while Article II limits claims of sovereignty over celestial territory (for instance, over portions of the lunar surface), it does not preclude the ownership of resources once extracted. This interpretation is grounded first in the textual argument that Article II is expressed in a terminology that implies a ban on land appropriation, not resources. The interpretation is also based on the coordination between Article II and Article I of the OST, the latter guaranteeing the freedom of exploration and use, a freedom that must be construed to include the right to extract natural resources as an element of use; otherwise, “use” would simply duplicate “exploration.” The interpretation is also grounded in the enactment of SRU laws as evidence of subsequent state practice. Under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, subsequent state practice must be taken into account when interpreting treaty provisions, such as Article II.
In conclusion, the SRU Laws reflect an emerging trend in contemporary State practice supporting the permissibility of SRU. Building on this interpretation, recent international initiatives have sought to translate these principles into practical frameworks for cooperation in space activities, such as the Artemis Accords—promoted by the United States and counting now more than fifty signatories—which are a set of non-binding political commitments that seek to operationalize the principles of the OST in the context of cooperative lunar activities; the Accords explicitly affirm the right to extract and utilize space resources, presenting such activities as consistent with international law.18 Similarly, China and its partners have advanced the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) initiative, which envisions a jointly constructed and operated lunar base under a cooperative framework distinct from, yet parallel to, the Artemis program, of which resource utilization is a key component.19 These multilateral initiatives reflect converging interpretations of the OST’s principles through cooperative mechanisms that complement national legislation.
The route of SRU through national law rather than international instruments inevitably introduces differences among the legal structures to which SRU operations will be subject. However, these differences are limited: a comparative analysis shows that existing SRU laws, despite varying in approach, are largely similar and consistent with the OST.
The Existing SRU Laws The United States In 2015, the United States took a pioneering step in regulating SRU with the enactment of the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA), the first comprehensive RSU Law. The Act explicitly recognizes that U.S. citizens engaged in the commercial recovery of space resources are entitled to possess, own, transport, use, and sell those resources, provided such activities are conducted under the authorization and supervision of the U.S. government. The legislation carefully avoids any assertion of sovereignty over celestial bodies, framing resource rights as a lawful exercise of the freedom to use outer space under Article I of the OST.
The U.S. regulatory framework has developed through some subsequent executive and agency measures, including Executive Order 13914 of 2020, which reaffirmed the nation’s opposition to the Moon Agreement and promoted international cooperation grounded in reciprocal recognition of resource rights. More recently, in August 2025, Executive Order 14335, titled “Enabling Competition in the Commercial Space Industry,” mandates a streamlined mission authorization regime for novel space activities, which includes SRU. The Order tasks the Secretary of Commerce with proposing, within 150 days, a unified “one-stop shop” process for mission authorization, shifting part of that authority from the Department of Transportation (FAA) to the Department of Commerce.20
Luxembourg Luxembourg became the second country to enact legislation explicitly recognizing ownership rights over extracted space resources with its 2017 Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources. The law—intended to attract foreign investment, provide legal certainty, and position Luxembourg as a leading center for space mining ventures—applies to companies incorporated in Luxembourg and subjects their activities to national authorization and supervision. While closely aligned with the U.S. model, Luxembourg’s approach has a more regulatory character by requiring financial and technical guarantees and establishing a detailed licensing process. The Luxembourg Space Resource Utilization Law also stands apart in that it explicitly addresses the non-appropriation clause of Article II of the OST, providing that “les ressources de l’espace sont susceptibles d’appropriation” (“space resources are susceptible of appropriation”), which reflects Luxembourg’s clear position that the non-appropriation principle applies only to celestial territory, not to extracted resources.21
The United Arab Emirates The United Arab Emirates’ Federal Law No. 12 of 2019 on the Regulation of the Space Sector (U.A.E.), Dec. 19, 2019, established a comprehensive national framework for space activities, encompassing the exploration and utilization of space resources and providing for a licensing regime administered by the UAE Space Agency. While property rights over extracted materials are not expressly recognized by the Law, Article 1 of Cabinet Resolution No. 19 of 2023 (UAE Space Resources Regulations) defines “Space Resources Activities” to include “owning, purchasing, selling, trading, transporting or storing Space Resources.” Also, the SRU framework relies on the existing property regime under the UAE Civil Code: Articles 109–110 provide that ownership and related real rights (such as usufruct and security interests) automatically apply once an object qualifies as property. By classifying extracted space resources as tradable and ownable, the UAE framework effectively brings them within that regimen.22
Japan Japan’s Act on the Promotion of Business Activities Related to the Exploration and Development of Space Resources, enacted in 2021, establishes a structured licensing regime for SRU companies. The legislation explicitly recognizes ownership rights over extracted resources while maintaining governmental oversight in accordance with Article VI of the OST. Article 2 of the Act defines “space resources” as “water, minerals and other natural resources that exist in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,” which leaves open the possibility that the term “natural resources” could extend to biological materials. The licensing regime—where licenses are granted by the Prime Minister following consultation with the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry—aims to ensure state supervision while fostering private participation in space resource development.23
Others Brazil has incorporated space resource utilization into its comprehensive Lei nº 14.946/2024 (the Lei Geral de Atividades Espaciais), which regulates a wide range of space activities and space-related activities.24 The Law’s scope includes “exploração de recursos espaciais” (exploration of space resources) within the ambit of regulated activities, treating SRU as one of the many space activities subject to licensing and governmental oversight.
Italy’s Space Economy Law (Legge 13 giugno 2025, n. 89) establishes a unified national framework for space activities. Article 2(1)(a) expressly includes among regulated activities “l’esplorazione, l’estrazione e l’uso delle risorse naturali dello spazio extra-atmosferico e dei corpi celesti, in conformità agli strumenti giuridici adottati a livello internazionale” (“the exploration, extraction, and use of natural resources in outer space and on celestial bodies, in accordance with international legal instruments”), thereby expressly subjecting SRU to national authorization and to Italy’s international obligations under the OST and related instrument.25
Conclusion: Evolving State Practice and the Emergence of a De Facto Legal Consensus The proliferation of national SRU Laws indicates a growing consensus that resource extraction and use are lawful under existing international law, with a permissive interpretation of the OST which has become the foundation of an emerging customary practice among spacefaring nations. The SRU Laws reveal both convergence and divergence in their legal treatment of SRU: convergence in the core principles—recognition of ownership over extracted resources, the requirement of governmental authorization and supervision, and the express disavowal of sovereignty claims over celestial bodies—and divergence in the details of implementation, including licensing procedures, financial guarantees, and the strategic motivations underlying national frameworks. All in all, these variations are not enough to amount to legal fragmentation but rather offer operators jurisdictional choices that—together with considerations of political stability, favorable financial and business environments, and regulatory predictability—make the selection among national regimes largely a matter of business strategy and policy preference.
As additional States adopt SRU legislation, a harmonized international understanding is likely to emerge organically through practice and bilateral cooperation, rather than through new multilateral treaties. The expanding ensemble of SRU laws, together with arrangements such as the Artemis Accords, already provide a sufficient legal basis for the lawful extraction and utilization of space resources, while fostering a stable and predictable environment for future operations in outer space. However, as resource extraction moves from research and development to reality, the central challenge for the future will be ensuring coordination among the several projects in order to avoid interferences among them (especially given the lack of coordination between the countries that are members of the Artemis Accords and the countries that are part of ILRS) and promote equitable and sustainable access to extraterrestrial resources.
For more on this topic, see Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, Jurisdictional Choice for Space Resource Utilization Projects: Current Space Resource Utilization Laws, 22 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 1 (2024), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol22/iss2/1.
ENDNOTES
Francesca Giannoni-Crystal is an attorney with Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, LLC. She holds two J.D. degrees—one from Italy and one from the United States—and an LL.M. in Space Law from the University of Mississippi School of Law. She advises companies across multiple sectors, including aerospace and defense, and serves as outside in-house counsel for the Pasquali Group, manufacturing microwaves and composites for the defense and aerospace sector. She can be reached at fgiannoni-crystal@cgcfirm.com.